Τρίτη 15 Σεπτεμβρίου 2015

A Chance to Turn Anger into Success

(άρθρο στο Greek Politics Specialist Group Pahmplet No 5)

The September 2015 Greek elections –the third time in a year that the country went to the polls– was another act of the political system’s inability to handle adequately the structural deficiencies of the domestic economy and to exit the severe crisis after six years of significant social cost. It was a broader effort, during the 2009-2015 period, that was characterized, unfortunately, by back and forth moves and strong political liquidity, as (a) the Greeks voted five times –since mid-2009– for their government, that is translated on average into a national election every 15 months; (b) seven political leaders and/or high-level personalities moved in the Prime minister’s cabinet; and (c) ten politicians and/or academics were appointed heads of the Ministry of Finance, which was the ministry with the core role of the (fiscal and economic) adjustment process towards the exit of the crisis. 
Thus, Greece has recently agreed on a third EU/ECB/IMF Support Package (or a bail-out agreement) since 2010, while the rest Euro area member-states that faced quite similar difficulties exited the crisis with just one support package. It was a third agreement, after deficiencies of the adjustment program characteristics (one size does not fit all) and weaknesses considering the “ownership” and the implementation of the reform program, that prevented a “Grexit” and, unexpectedly, was supported by the large majority of the parliamentarian landscape.

Unfortunately, the broad political support on the new program, which was the largest in parliamentary terms since the beginning of the crisis, was not depicted in governmental changes that could forward the implementation of structural reforms and the recovery of the economy. Politics has overcome economics one more time and, in particularly, “micro-politics”, as the leader party decided to go to national elections in order to deal with its internal problems after the U-turn that led to an agreement for a third program. The pre-election period the followed was consistent with the “immaturity” that characterized the political elite, as the major debate retained populistic elements, was based on vague terminology and was focused on quasi-moral arguments on the past. There was a significant absence of public and political dialogue on the way forward, the needed reforms and the distribution of social costs during the new effort to exit the crisis. It is a state of political and institutional “immaturity” during which society is not absent, as it feeds its existence and continuance. People, and especially, the young –justifiably to a large degree if we take into account the heavy burden that is on their shoulders– seemed to remain angry and preferring to make a “reaction statement” toward the status quo of the “adjustment era” instead of focusing on the (real) factors that led to the collapse of the Greek economy paradigm.

This attitude was depicted –to a large extent– in the results of the September 2015 elections as a significant part of the society either aligned with the dominant pre-election narrative or preferred to abstain from the voting process (historical lower rate of participation), or even voted for the neo-Nazis party. However, the ultra-positive development is that this attitude remained pro-European, as more than 80% of the new parliamentarian landscape supports the country’s position into the Euro area, while the major political movement that supported a “Grexit” did not manage to enter the Parliament.


The crucial challenge of the re-elected SYRIZA-ANEL government is –after a period of economic turmoil (deposit outflows, capital controls in the banking sector, public finances deterioration, shrinkage of growth dynamics, negative pressures on employment, etc.) and social pressures (increased refugees/migrants inflows, etc.)– to work, with the support of the EU partners, on the establishment of a “business as usual” environment. A stable environment, based on the implementation of the third program, would allow deposits to gradually return to the banking system (after the new recapitalization), enterprises to plan their business activities, investments to take place, international transactions to be fully implemented (eliminating the “Grexit” anxiety), new jobs to be created, long-term debt sustainability to be enhanced, etc. So, the sooner the situation is stabilized the better the prospects of the economy will be. Such a “success story” (lovely phrase for some Greek politicians) can contribute significantly to the maturity process of the political elite, but also of the Greek society, turning anger into constructive passion for a new paradigm for the Greek economy.

(δημοσιεύθηκε στο Pamphlet No 5, "First Thoughts on the 20 September 2015 Election in Greece", edited by R. Gerodimos, Greek Politics Specialist Group, εδώ)