(συνέντευξη στην Katarina Kovacikova)
1. Do you
think that conditions from creditors are acceptable for Greeks or not? Why?
It’s difficult to answer about the conditions and
proposals from our partners and creditors, as these proposals have been changed
and withdrawn as the support program has been expired. Surely, austerity is not
an easy to accept condition. Especially, after a difficult five-year period
under a fiscal adjustment program. The previous fiscal adjustment program
should have taken seriously into account the peculiarities of Greece, which is
a state-led market economy. The adjustment has different results in a case like
Greece than in a case of a liberal economy, or even of a coordinated market
economy. One size does not fit all. That’s why the adjustment packages led to
deeper than expected recession. It is the famous “multipliers” issue. In parallel,
the initial adjustment was based more on tax revenues –by increasing rates and
not dealing with tax evasion– and not on public expenditures. Private sector
was mostly harmed and unemployment increased extremely. Further recessionary
pressures were created. The deeper the recession, the larger was the needed
effort to achieve the fiscal targets, in a very short period of time and
without a growth package to countervail recession. It was a vicious cycle that
should have been predicted during the planning of the first program in 2010.
So, all these elements must be taken into account by all parties in order to
plan and promote a program aligned with the peculiarities of the Greek economy,
in order to allow a sustainable exit from the crisis.
2. Would not
it be easier if Greece left the Eurozone? Why?
The answer is clear: NO. Eurozone is one of the
most advanced economies and markets of the world, with a lot of potential. A
return to an unstable currency regime for an import-based and
consumption-oriented economy with ultra-low export activity (even after the
5-year internal devaluation) and low competitiveness will create extremely
negative effects for the living standards of the society and, especially, for
the poor and low-income citizens. The answer is to focus on structural reforms
that will allow Greece to increase its competitiveness and make the best use of
the potential of the Eurozone.
3. Most of
the bailout plans were designed to help the private banking system and only
about 10 percent went into the government's budget. Some critics said that
Greek Bailout Saved Bankers, But Punished the People. What do you think about
that? What is your opinion on the distribution of financie from a rescue loan?
The numbers are clear. The one half of the rescue
package was channelled to the public debt management in order to pay old loans/bonds
and fund the dual debt-restructuring during 2012. Public debt is just the
accumulation of general government deficits of the previous years. Considering
the other half, the one fourth of the package was absorbed by the general
government budget to cover primary balance and interests, while the rest one
fourth was channelled to the recapitalization of banks. Thus, around 75 percent
of the rescue package funded current and past needs of the state: public debt
amortization and fiscal deficits. Along with the support package, Greece needed
to stabilize its public finances, in order not to further increase its funding
needs. So, the crucial point is the wrong structure of the previous adjustment
effort that hurt more some citizens and social groups, while it did not create
the space for the promotion of a broad reform packages. This adjustment recipe
must change.
4. If the
Greeks say no in a referendum, what will follow? Do you think that there are
chances of an agreement between Greece and creditors?
I do not really know what will follow. The only
thing I know and believe is that Greece should immediately reach to an
agreement with our partners and creditors in order to stabilize the situation
of the economy into the Eurozone. It’s our only way to development and social
cohesion.
(δημοσιεύθηκε στο www.aktuality.sk και είναι διαθέσιμο εδώ)
